江汉大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2012, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (1): 44-46.

• 物理 • 上一篇    下一篇

车辆保险欺诈的信号传递博弈模型

陈敏1,王华2   

  1. 1.咸宁学院数学与统计学院,湖北咸宁437100;
    2.公安县职业技术教育中心学校,湖北公安434300
  • 收稿日期:2011-11-13 出版日期:2012-02-20 发布日期:2013-11-07
  • 作者简介:陈敏单位1978-),女,讲师,硕士,研究方向:金融数学。与数量经济分析研究。
  • 基金资助:
    咸宁学院科研基金资助项目单位KY10047

Signaling Game Model of Vehicle Insurance Fraud

CHEN Min1,WANG Hua2   

  1. 1.School of Mathematics and Statistics,Xianning University,Xianning 437100,Hubei,China;
    2.Gong′an Country Vocational School,Gong′an 434300,Hubei,China
  • Received:2011-11-13 Online:2012-02-20 Published:2013-11-07

摘要: 基于博弈论中的信号传递博弈理论,通过对车辆保险欺诈中投保人和保险公司双方的分析,建立了一个关于车辆保险欺诈的信号传递博弈模型,得出了投保人进行欺诈的临界概率和保险公司进行审核的临界概率。另外,在给定保险公司最优策略的情况下,给出了保险公司的保费计算公式。

关键词: 保险欺诈, 信号传递, 纳什均衡, 风险规避

Abstract: In this paper, a signaling game model of vehicle insurance fraud was established based on analysis for the insured and the insurance company in vehicle insurance fraud. The critical probabilities of insured fraud and insurance company auditing were obtained. Furthermore, in the situation of a given optimal strategy for insurance company, the premium formula was proposed.

Key words: insurance fraud, signal transduction, Nash equilibrium, risk aversion

中图分类号: