JIANGHAN ACADEMIC ›› 2021, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (5): 111-119.doi: 10.16388/j.cnki.cn42-1843/c.2021.05.011

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Freedom Based on Causality:From a Contention between Theories of Radical Will and Moral Responsibility without Will

YIN Mengjie   

  1. School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan Hubei 430072
  • Received:2021-02-15 Online:2021-10-15 Published:2021-07-05

Abstract: The relationship between free will and moral responsibility is a major concern of the academia.Some philosophers,including Peter van Inwagen and Harry Frankfurt,regard free will as the ultimate bearer of moral responsibility. Others,including John Martin Fischer and Daniel Dennett,believe that moral accountability can be done without resorting to free will. In this context,theorists of radical will,represented by Nie Minli and Huang Yusheng,and those of moral responsibility without will,with Su Dechao a representative,had a debate on such issues as“whether free will exists or not”and“whether free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.”Then Liu Qingping and other researchers joined in the discussion. The nature of the controversy is whether freedom is compatible with causality. Theorists of radical will can hardly explain moral responsibility because of the insufficiency in their setting of free will;in contrast,the explanation provided by theorist in favor of moral responsibility without will is more convincing,and freedom is compatible with causality.

Key words: free will, moral responsibility, causality, compatibilisim

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