“高薪养廉”还是“高薪致腐”？——基于中国证券市场的经验证据

doi:10.16388/j.cnki.cn42-1843/c.2018.01.003

江汉学术 ›› 2018, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 22-31.doi: 10.16388/j.cnki.cn42-1843/c.2018.01.003

“高薪养廉”还是“高薪致腐”？——基于中国证券市场的经验证据

林川¹，曹国华²

¹四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心，重庆400031；²重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，重庆400044

收稿日期:2018-01-22 修回日期:2018-01-22 出版日期:2018-02-15 发布日期:2018-01-18
作者简介:林川，男，山东青岛人，四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心副教授，博士；曹国华，男，安徽宣城人，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重点项目“制度环境、公司财务政策选择和动态演化研究”（71232004）

“High Payment to Restrain Corruption”or“High Salary to Encourage Corruption”：Based on Chinese Securities Market Empirical Evidence

LIN Chuan¹，CAO Guohua²

¹Research Center for International Business and Economy, Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing 400031, China；²College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044

Received:2018-01-22 Revised:2018-01-22 Online:2018-02-15 Published:2018-01-18

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来，“反腐败”已经成为中国经济领域中一个非常重要的话题。以中国沪深A 股2007—2014 年间的1415 个上市公司为样本，可实证检验高管薪酬与高管腐败之间存在的关系。研究发现，高管薪酬在高管的显性腐败与隐性腐败之间表现出完全不同的关系。在显性腐败行为中，高管薪酬与腐败行为之间存在显著的负相关关系，即“高薪养廉”，也就是说高管获得的薪酬水平越高，则高管显性腐败的概率越低；而在隐性腐败行为中，高管薪酬则与腐败行为之间存在显著的正相关关系，即“高薪致腐”，也就是说高管获得的薪酬水平越高，则高管隐性腐败的程度会更高。另外，研究还发现，相较于非国有属性的企业，“高薪养廉”在国有属性的企业中表现得更为明显。

关键词: 高管薪酬, 高薪养廉, 高薪致腐, 反腐败

Abstract: In recent years,“anti-corruption”has been an important topic in the field of Chinese economy.This paper empirically examines the relationships between senior executives?? payment and the probability of their corruption, based on a sample of 1,415 listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A share markets in 2007—2014. The study found that, different relationships exist between their high payments and overt corruption or hidden corruption. In the aspect of overt corruption, the correlation between payment and corruption is significantly negative, which suggests high payment restrains corruption, or in an other word, the higher the payment, the lower the probability of overt corruption. And in hidden corruption, the correlation is significantly positive , which means high payment encourages corruption, or, the higher the payment, the higher the probability of hidden corruption. The study also found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon of ‘high payment restraining corruption’is more evident in state-owned enterprises.

Key words: executive payment, high payment restraining corruption, anti-corruption

中图分类号:

F276

林川，曹国华. “高薪养廉”还是“高薪致腐”？——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 江汉学术, 2018, 37(1): 22-31.

LIN Chuan，CAO Guohua. “High Payment to Restrain Corruption”or“High Salary to Encourage Corruption”：Based on Chinese Securities Market Empirical Evidence[J]. JIANGHAN ACADEMIC, 2018, 37(1): 22-31.

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“高薪养廉”还是“高薪致腐”？——基于中国证券市场的经验证据

“High Payment to Restrain Corruption”or“High Salary to Encourage Corruption”：Based on Chinese Securities Market Empirical Evidence

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